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The terms of the debate about anthropological approaches to the value question in India 
have been set by Dumont, whose theories were based on his ethnographic studies in North 
and South India, his knowledge of the Sanskrit literature, his synthesis of the comparative 
ethnography of India, and his studies on the history of European economic thought. His 
theory of affinity as a value, one element of this general theory, was based on a critique of 
Lévi-Strauss and was, in turn, critiqued by Trautmann, among others. On the basis of 
fieldwork done in Central India, I draw attention to an unexamined assumption that all 
three theorists share, and I also consider its consequences. 
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The value question has been a preoccupation of Brahman scholars for millennia, 
and their theories of value as total social phenomena bring together family values 
(e.g., kanya daan, the virgin-bride gift), religious values (e.g., Brahmans as pure), 
and economic values (e.g., profit taking as a virtue for the merchant classes) as part 
of a structured hierarchical whole. Of course, the Brahmans did not speak with 
one voice, nor did all non-Brahmans accept the “impure” status foisted upon them, 
a fact that became apparent when the subaltern found her voice. Regional variation, 
too, has complicated the debate because cross-cousin marriage is regarded as a 
virtue in the south and a vice in the north.  
Anthropologists have contributed to this debate with ethnographically informed 
critiques from different regions. Such was the approach adopted by Dumont, 
whose ethnographic fieldwork in villages in both North and South India has 
informed the development of his controversial theories which, for better or worse, 
have defined the terms of the debate today. The breadth and depth of Dumont’s 
scholarly work place him in a league of his own as a value theorist. His 
ethnographic studies in North and South India and his comparative 
anthropological work on the sociology, economy, and religion of India and 
Europe—combined with his study of the history of ideas about value in the Sanskrit, 
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English, French, and German literature—cover a terrain that few of his many critics 
have even attempted to tread. On the other hand, the central theme that permeates 
all his work—hierarchy is to India as equality is to Europe—is so simple that he 
provides his critics with an easy target to shoot down.   
Dismissing Dumont’s work, then, is easy, but critiquing it in the old-fashioned 
sense of criticism, modification, and transcendence is an altogether different matter. 
This is because fieldwork in the classic British empiricist tradition is the basis for 
all his abstract generalizations. He uses this method, along with the comparative 
ethnographic method, to construct arguments of ever-increasing generality and 
ever-widening geographical spread. Dumont greatly admired British ethnography 
(Galey 2000: 325), and he produced fine-grained studies that can be compared to 
the very best of that tradition. For example, his A South Indian subcaste (Dumont 
1986b), first published in French in 1957, “remains,” as his editor and translator 
notes, “the most extensive and comprehensive description of an Indian caste in the 
ethnographic literature” (Moffatt 1986: iii). The fieldwork for this book was 
conducted in Tamil, a Dravidian language. His two years in Tamil Nadu starting in 
late 1948 was followed by fifteen months of fieldwork in North India in two stints 
over the period from 1954 to 1958. This latter work was carried out in Hindi, an 
Indo-Aryan language. It is the original data from this fieldwork that Dumont has 
mined for his theoretical insights; he is not a comparativist in the armchair 
tradition of Indian kinship theorists such Lévi-Strauss (1949) and Trautmann 
(1981). Both Dumont’s fieldtrips were preceded by studies of ancient Sanskrit 
texts, a language he picked up while a prisoner of war. His classic synthetic work 
on caste, Homo hierarchicus: The caste system and its implications (Dumont 
1980), first published in French in 1966, followed. His ethnographic work on 
kinship led to comparative work on Australia in his Affinity as a value (Dumont 
1983), while his comparative work on economic value and ideology led him to 
Europe in his work on Homo aequalis (Dumont 1977, 1986a, 1991), a study that 
involved reading the original French, English, and German texts.  
It is much easier, then, to dismiss Dumont than it is to critique him. To dismiss 
is to ridicule with arrogance, but to critique is to dignify from a position of humility. 
The latter is the position I try to adopt here by focusing on one narrow aspect of 
his general theory of value: affinity. His argument about affinity as a value in South 
India is but part and parcel of his general comparative argument about equality and 
hierarchy in the world at large, but I restrict myself here to some ethnographically 
informed arguments about the nature of alliance in India.     
My own fieldwork was done in Central India (hereafter CI) on the frontier zone 
between the Indo-Aryan north and the Dravidian south. I use this perspective, 
triangulated with some of Dumont’s ethnography, to draw attention to an 
unexamined assumption that informs the theories not only of Dumont (1966) but 
also of Lévi-Strauss (1949), whose theories he critiqued, and Trautmann (1981), 
who in turned critiqued Dumont. Differences aside, all three theorists equate 
alliance with marital alliance, thereby overlooking the significance of fraternal 
alliance. Lévi-Strauss’s great achievement was to raise the question of fraternal 
alliance, but that was only to dismiss its significance relative to marital alliance. 
Trautmann’s theory of Dravidian kinship in India is premised on the assumption 
that a cross-cousin marriage rule is the key to understanding the semantic value of 
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reference terms not only in India but, pace Dumont, among the Australian 
Aborigines and elsewhere.     
Dumont’s affinity as a value thesis, which Trautmann (1981: 174) finds to be a 
“bizarre way of looking at the matter,” also takes, at least at face value, a marriage-
centric approach to alliance. Dumont’s theory is indeed bizarre, but this is because 
it contains a contradiction in that it embodies the seed of the contrary argument 
that fraternity is the key value. This contradiction is not fatal to his theory; to the 
contrary, it is a creative contradiction that opens up new questions for research.   
My paper is divided into three sections. The first section critically examines 
Dumont’s affinity as a value argument in light of the theoretical arguments of Lévi-
Strauss and Trautmann, as well as some ethnographic evidence on kinship 
reference and address in Central India. The second section develops the idea that 
a consideration of fraternity as a value raises the question of the pragmatics of 
address in addition to the classic question of the semantics of reference. The third 
section, on fraternity as a value, develops the implications of this idea for 
understanding the cultural specificity of Dravidian and non-Dravidian kinship in 
India.  
  
Dumont on aff inity as a value  
If some of Dumont’s main thesis about equality and hierarchy is expressed in 
clear, comprehensible language, then some of his minor theses are expressed in 
opaque language that is often visually illustrated with equally incomprehensible 
diagrams. His affinity as a value thesis is, alas, a proposition of this kind. However, 
if we see his general theses as second- and third-order abstractions from his 
ethnographic data and follow him on his journey from concretion to abstraction, 
then his arguments not only become clearer, but they also become persuasive. 
Here is his summary formulation of his thesis: 
 With us modern Westerners, affinity is subordinated to consanguinity, 
for my brother-in-law, an affine, becomes an uncle, a consanguineal 
relative, for my children. In other words, affinity is ephemeral; it merges 
into consanguinity in the next generation. As values are by definition 
conceived of as permanent, durable, I may say that affinity is inferior to 
consanguinity, or undervalued in relation to it. Now my thesis is that the 
specificity of the South Indian kinship system lies in the fact that affinity 
there is transmitted from generation to generation, is thus permanent 
and durable, and so has equal status with consanguinity, or a value equal 
to it. (Dumont 1983: vii) 
This statement poses two unsubstantiated assertions and a number of questions. 
The unsubstantiated assertions are that in South India (hereafter SI) consanguinity 
is equal to affinity, whereas it is greater than affinity in Europe. These assertions 
can be formulated as follows: 
 
SI:  consanguinity = affinity   (1) 
Europe:  consanguinity > affinity   (2) 
 
These formulations pose the question of the situation in North India (hereafter 
NI). Is consanguinity greater than, less than, or equal to affinity? Dumont does not 
address this question explicitly in his Affinity book, but he alludes to it in another 
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article where he critiques the cross-cousin marriage criterion as a basis for 
contrasting NI kinship with SI kinship. Such criterion, he notes, negatively 
characterizes North Indian kinship and “does not take into account the numerous 
and important features common to both regions, which can be roughly summed 
up as a considerable stress on marriage” (Dumont 1966: 90). The logic of his 
argument leaves only one possible interpretation of this statement: that 
consanguinity is less than affinity in NI (i.e., that it is different from the situation 
found in Europe and similar but different from that found in SI). We can write this 
as follows: 
 
NI:   consanguinity < affinity    (3) 
 
These three propositions constitute the essence of Dumont’s affinity as a value 
thesis and do so by posing a key question: What is the nature of the value that 
informs the greater than, less than, and equals signs? This is the question that I 
shall try to address in this essay. 
Propositions (1) and (2) were elaborated on in his infamous 1953 Man article 
(reprinted in Dumont 1983)—infamous because it was greeted with derision. The 
offending argument was his assertion that “the basic meaning of the terms for the 
‘cross’ category is affinal—my mother’s brother is essentially my father’s affine” 
(Dumont 1983: 12). This can be formally expressed as  
 
SI:  MB = FWB    (4) 
 
and visually as in the following diagram: 
 
 
 
This proposition was greeted with complete incomprehension: “I cannot claim that 
I understand the article of Dravidian kinship terminology by Mr. Dumont,” 
Radcliffe-Brown admitted, “but I can assure Mr. Dumont that amongst the 
Australian natives the maternal uncle is thought of as the brother of Ego’s mother 
and not as the brother-in-law of the father” (reproduced in Dumont 1983: 20). 
Trautmann (1981: 174) called it a “bizarre way of looking at the matter.” His 
powerful critique of Dumont’s theory affirms the conventional wisdom that the key 
defining characteristic of Dravidian kinship is cross-cousin marriage (i.e., that 
consanguinity, not affinity, defines it). The proof of this is that one term, mamam, 
refers to both MB and FZH. 
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Dumont’s 1953 article also contains a number of other unusual propositions 
that need to be introduced before I move on. The first is that “cross cousins are 
essentially ego’s affines” (Dumont 1983: 14), which can, for a male ego, be written 
as 
 
SI:   MBS = WB (ms) = FWBS   (5) 
 
and illustrated visually as follows: 
 
 
 
Dumont uses a diagram of this kind, which embodies propositions (4) and (5), to 
illustrate his argument that affinity as a value is inherited from father to son. Few 
have been persuaded because Dumont’s choice of language does not make sense. 
Why insist on calling a consanguineal relationship an affinal relationship? This 
argument has the appearance of a decree of the kind that declares that, henceforth, 
black is white.  
We can begin to make sense of it when we get to the final proposition, the one 
Dumont rightly considered most important. This is the idea that, in South India, 
the two categories of kin and affines comprehend all relatives without 
any third category. This may be understood without resorting to dual 
organization; the opposition between kin and affines constitutes the 
whole—the affine of my affine is my brother; marriage is in a sense the 
whole society, which it unites, and at the same time separates in two from 
the point of view of one Ego. (Dumont 1983: 17, emphasis added) 
Two key, but related, issues are at stake here, as indicated by the italicized phrases. 
The proposition “the affine of my affine is my brother” is equivalent to saying that 
my wife’s brother’s wife’s brother (WBWB) is my brother (B), which can be 
formulated as follows:  
 
SI:    B = WBWB     (6) 
 
This is visually captured in the following diagram, which also embodies another 
version of proposition (5): 
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From Alter-ego’s perspective, we get two equivalent propositions: ZH = MBS and 
B = ZHZH, which are visually illustrated as follows: 
 
 
 
Dumont’s argument that affinity “has equal status with consanguinity, or a value 
equal to it” (1983: vii) is tantamount to the claim that affinity can create 
consanguinity. It is one thing to look at an actual relationship of consanguinity and 
call it a relationship of affinity (as illustrated in (4) and (5) above) but quite another 
to look at an actual relationship of affinity and call it a relationship of consanguinity 
as (6) illustrates. Of course, it is not Dumont who has made up this proposition; 
rather, the Tamil speakers he worked with did. It is their mode of valuing certain 
kin. Dumont’s “bizarre” propositions (4) and (5) simply take the idea to its logical 
conclusion. But is his use of theoretical language appropriate? If Tamil speakers 
say that Ego’s wife’s brother is deemed to be a cousin, while his double affine, his 
wife’s brother’s wife’s brother, is deemed to be a brother, then this formulation 
throws into question the very meaning of the words “affine” and “consanguine.”  
Dumont’s decision to continue using these terms as the labels for his theoretical 
categories was an unhappy choice. Two factors were no doubt at play here as he 
struggled to express this idea the he gained from his informants in the general 
language of theory. First, his Tamil informants, unlike my Halbi informants, had 
no names for the general theoretical category he identified in their kinship system; 
secondly, Lévi-Strauss’s magnum opus, The elementary structures of kinship 
(1949), had just been published, and his language of “marital alliance” was in the 
ascendancy.  
The Halbi word that best captures Dumont’s notion of affinity as a value is 
dadabhai, a compound word that translates as “brotherhood.” It consists of the 
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word dada, an address term for elder brother and father’s father, and bhai, a 
reference term for “brother.” The word dadabhai, along with its complement saga, 
refers to an “opposition between kin and affines” that “constitutes the whole,” to 
use Dumont’s language. Brothers, bhai, fall into two classes. The first is maina bhai, 
which can be glossed as “cross brother” (XB). Among the referents within the 
category XB are genealogical referents such as WB, MBS, FZS, and the like. 
Dumont’s proposition (5) in his theory then becomes, in the language of Halbi 
speakers: 
  
maina bhai = XB = MBS = WB = ZH     
 
The second is an unmarked category of bhai (B) that includes referents such as B, 
FF, and WBWB, among many others. Thus, Dumont’s equation (6) becomes 
 
bhai = B = WBWB = ZHZH 
     
These are the Halbi words for the two types of fraternal alliance that have the 
appearance of marital alliance. The following diagram captures the Halbi usages 
for Ego as EGO and Alter-ego as (ego).  
  
 
 
Halbi kinship is an example of a Central Indian system that has an Indo-Aryan 
lexicon with a Dravidian semantics (Trautmann 1981). Lexicons are culturally 
specific, but their semantic structures are general; the sub-categories (unmarked) 
bhai (B) and maina bhai (XB) capture the super-category bhai (B) that Dumont 
identified but failed to name. In other words, the word bhai is a polyvalent category 
that has many levels of meaning that equations of the type given above can merely 
hint at.  
Following Lévi-Strauss, we can call these affinally created alliances fraternal 
alliances. Lévi-Strauss’s great achievement was to distinguish between marital 
alliances and fraternal alliances, but, wedded as he was to the idea that moieties 
(dual organization) rather than brotherhoods were the elementary structures of 
kinship, he raised the concept of brotherhood only to dismiss its significance: “It is 
far from our mind to claim that the exchange or gift of women is the only way to 
establish an alliance in primitive societies,” Lévi-Strauss (1947: 483) notes. The 
establishment of blood brotherhood, he adds, creates a bond of alliance, which 
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entails the prohibition of a marriage with the sister. But this, he argues, is a form of 
mechanical solidarity, which “adds nothing and unities nothing,” unlike marital 
alliances, which are a form of organic solidarity and bring about “an integration of 
the group on a new plane” (1947: 484). 
While Lévi-Strauss concedes that marital alliance has its limits, he is unable to 
go the full distance and allow for the fact that fraternal alliance, too, may be 
consequential. To admit this much would be to question the fundamental 
assumption upon which his theory depends: the incest taboo. The relationship 
between incest and exogamy was a much debated subject when Lévi-Strauss was 
writing. Indeed, the Seligman referred to in his opening sentence is Brenda 
Seligman, who argued that it “it is rash to assume the universality of the idea that 
the supreme gift is that of a woman and that marital relations cements social 
solidarity” (1935: 91). She also quotes the case of Tikopia, “where the whole 
population is in reality related, [and] marriage with the classificatory brother or 
sister, though said not to be correct, is inevitable and is tolerated” (1935: 86). In 
India, sibling marriage is the norm, but not all siblings are marriageable. In Bastar, 
for example, marriageable siblings are marked by the adjective maina. Thus, a 
woman marries her maina bhai, her cross-brother (XB), as the diagram above 
illustrates. To call this cross-cousin marriage as anthropologists always do is to deny 
oneself access to the native point of view, which Malinowski (1922: 25) rightly 
stressed was the goal of the ethnographer.  
Lévi-Strauss’s (1949: 394) marital-alliance-centric approach is apparent in his 
analysis of data from Central India, where he correctly notes that dadabhai is not a 
moiety but sees it as an “exact equivalent” of the Kachin wife-giving group mayu ni. 
However, he has to change the data to make it fit his model: in Central India, 
patrilateral cross-cousin marriage, not matrilateral cross-cousin marriage, is the 
moral ideal, as his figure 75 depicts. However, he does notice that “it is curious 
that in these conditions the most frequent marriage is not with the mother’s 
brother’s daughter but with the father’s sister’s daughter” (1949: 395). If one takes 
a fraternal-alliance-centric approach—the insider’s perspective—then the data ceases 
to be curious. 
Dumont, dismissive as he was about so-called tribal India—an administrative 
category devoid of explanatory adequacy that he uncritically accepted—nevertheless 
realized that Australian models of dual organization were not applicable to India:  
While Australia has global models of the society, we are left, in India 
and elsewhere, with representations attached to an individual ego, 
representations that are in that sense irremediably local, and there is no 
way to infer the global from the local. 
While, from the present point of view, Australia is characterized by 
a global model of society as made up of intermarrying groups (or 
marriage sections as they are sometimes called), India has only 
categories, which regulate the repetition of intermarriage—or, as I call it, 
the marriage alliance—but which operate in each case by reference to a 
particular locus and thus exclusively take the form of what is called in 
anthropological jargon “cross-cousin marriage.” (Dumont 1983: viii, italic 
emphasis in original, underlined emphasis added) 
Thus, Australia is to South India as global is to local, and as groups are to 
categories. But what is “ego-centric” opposed to? The zero sign is obviously “socio-
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centric,” from which it follows that moieties are opposed to brotherhood as dual 
organization is to kindred groupings. These contrasts can be arrayed in a table as 
follows: 
 
Austral ia  India 
Global Local 
Groups Categories 
Socio-centric Ego-centric 
Moieties Brotherhoods 
Dual Organization Kindred Groups 
  
In sum, Indian kinship is not an “elementary structure” in Lévi-Strauss’s (1949) 
terms. Rather, “elementary form”—an idea that evokes the eye of the beholder—is 
more like it. The local ego-centric kindred groups called brotherhoods make no 
sense when looked at from the perspective of global socio-centric moieties of the 
dual organization type found in Oceania and elsewhere. 
The pseudo-mathematical language of “equations” that kinship theorists use is a 
very imperfect way to talk about kinship equivalences of the type I have discussed 
above. This language covers a semantic field that includes absolute identity at one 
extreme, via various notions of similitude, to generalized agreement on the other; 
but, as a word that stands opposed to inequality in some form or another, it is 
useful in that it poses the question of value. What is the process of valuation by 
which diverse entities are brought into some sort of agreement, be it absolute 
identity or generalized sameness on the one hand or inequality of some kind on 
the other? Such is the question that value theorists have always pondered, for it is a 
question that has concerned people of all ages. For example, the principle that 
informs relations of equality and inequality within and between castes is not just an 
academic question; in fact, people in India live the issue on an everyday basis as 
they are confronted with the problem of whether to accept food or water from the 
hand of someone they consider inferior. Dumont’s answer to the abstract 
theoretical question this poses is well known, but when it comes to the valuation of 
kin, his theories are pregnant with ideas that remain to be developed—and his 
notion of affinity as a value is one such idea. Dumont has perceived the problem 
but has not found the language to pose it. As we have seen, the problem is not one 
of affinity as a value but of fraternity as a value: By what process are some non-kin 
in India reckoned to be siblings? Who is the valuer? What are the values he or she 
uses in the valuation process?   
A short theoretical interlude is necessary before looking at the data. 
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Theoretical interlude on the notion of value 
 
Marx and the exchange-value of commodit ies  
The preceding analysis has added four value equations to the initial two with which 
we began, but the question of the theory of value that informs the equations 
remains. Such was the question Marx (1867: 70) asked when confronted with the 
problem posed by commodity exchange: What, for example, is the common 
substance that equates twenty yards of linen with one coat to form a commodity 
equation of the following kind?  
 
Commodities:   20 yards of linen = 1 coat   
  
The equation between B and BWBW in (6) poses the analogous question for the 
kinship theorist: Wherein lies the fraternal oneness between a male ego and the 
affine of his affine whom he refers to and/or addresses as brother? Or, in other 
words, by what thought processes do SI people establish that BWBW is a 
brother? The theoretical language in which this question is expressed is crucial, 
because if we ask the wrong question, we will get the wrong answer. We need a 
language that is transcultural—one that does not bring with it implicit assumptions 
from another culture.  
Marxian value theory, concerned as it is with commodities and the labor 
involved in their production, is a quantitative value theory because the problem of 
value presents itself as one of price as expressed in units of a currency. For 
example, if a coat costs $15, the problem presents itself as the following: 
 
Money-price:  $15 = 20 yards of linen = 1 coat 
 
In contrast, the valuation of kin presents itself first as a problem of language in the 
form of the lexical items used to refer to people, and second as a problem of face-
to-face address, which may involve non-verbal as well as verbal signs. The first 
problem raises the question of semantics and the second of pragmatics. Saussure 
had some interesting things to say about linguistic values of the former kind, and 
Jakobson about the very different value question that face-to-face address poses.  
  
Saussure and the exchange-value of reference terms 
The notion of linguistic value comes from Saussure, who argued that the move 
from lexicology to semantic structure is a move from signs to values. Linguistic 
value, Saussure (1915: 114–17) argues, is concerned with the exchange-value of the 
signs in much the same way that economic value is concerned with the exchange-
value of commodities. Furthermore, just as Marx argues that the values that inform 
exchange-values come from outside the sphere of exchange, so Saussure argues 
that linguistic value is determined by the greater system of signs of which it is a 
part.  
“Sheep,” he argued, “has the same meaning as the French word mouton, but 
not the same value, for mouton can also be used to mean the lamb meat, whereas 
sheep cannot, because it has been delimited by mutton” (Saussure 1915: 115). 
Insofar as kinship terms are concerned, we can see that the reference term mama 
in Hindi has the same meaning as the word mamam in Tamil, but not the same 
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value, for mamam in Tamil can also be used to mean the FZH, whereas mama 
cannot because it has been delimited by the referent MB. Speakers of any given 
language are formulating exchange-values all the time without necessarily being 
aware of it. If you ask a Hindi speaker, “What is the relationship between FZ and 
MB?,” they will instantly reply, “A sister/brother relationship.” In other words, the 
exchange-value of FZ/MB is Z/B, which can be written as the following value 
equation: 
 
NI:   bubu/mama = FZ/MB = bahin/bhai = Z/B 
  
This exchange-value is culturally specific to NI Hindi speakers; SI Tamil speakers 
have a different answer, as we shall see. In Saussure’s terms, they are in a different 
“environment,” which raises the very difficult extra-linguistic question of the 
identity of the valuers in those environments.  
It also should be noted that the formal linguistic-value of kinship terms is in the 
form of an exchange ratio that abstracts from the ego. This is because reciprocal 
reference cancels out the ego, as it were. Equations of the kind above can be 
deduced from sentences such as “The bubu/mama relation is a bahin/bhai 
relation” or “My bubu and my mama refer to each other as bhai and bahin.” The 
speaker in the latter sentence is the ego for two of the terms, bubu and mama, but 
not for the terms bhai and bahin; the ego in this example is a classic example of a 
“shifter” (Silverstein 1976).  
 
We are now in a position to grasp the linguistic values that inform proposition (6) 
B = WBWB. From male Ego’s perspective, when he refers to his WBWB, the 
valuation is a semantic valuation of a linguistic kind. In other words, it is a purely 
linguistic phenomenon—an exchange-value between reference terms. When male 
Ego refers to WBWB as B, the implication is that Alter-ego refers to ZHZH as B, 
too.   
Thus, proposition (6) has the following more precise exchange-value formulation: 
 
SI:   WBWB/ZHZH = B/B   (6a) 
 
The reality in SI is that relative age divides brothers so that they are never equal: 
Ego’s elder brother is referred to as akka in Tamil, the younger as tambi.  Thus, 
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the equality is expressed by the mutual use of these terms by Ego and Alter-ego. 
Assuming WBWB is older, we get the following proposition: 
 
SI:  akka/tambi = eB/yB = WBWB/ZHZH = B/B  
  
The diagrammatic form of this equation is as follows: 
 
 
 
The terms akka and tambi are equal in the sense that they both belong to the same 
semantic field of “brother” (B), but they are unlike in that they belong to different sub-
fields in this semantic space. As members of the category “brother” (B), which is 
unmarked in Tamil but not in Halbi, they are unlike cross-brothers (XB). But at the 
super-category level B, they are in the same field as XB but opposed to the super-
category “sister” (Z). In other words, formal linguistic value is determined by the posi-
tion of the term on the branches of a semantic tree. The equations above are useful as a 
shorthand mode of expression only because they flatten the different levels; linguistic 
value of a semantic kind must be understood as a tree or its equivalent matrix form.  
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This poses the comparative question of how many semantic trees of the sibling 
kind there are in India. Are these species of the same kind of generic tree or 
radically different generic types? For Dumont (1980), a lumper, India is one and 
his unfinished task was to demonstrate this fact. For his critics, such as Trautmann 
(1981), a splitter, Indian kinship consists of two incommensurable paradigms.  
 
Jakobson and the moral  value of face- to-face address 
Using the exchange-value of reference terms is only one way to think about 
linguistic value; the other is address terminology. This introduces a completely new 
mode of valuation for reasons that Jakobson (1960) outlines. Language has many 
functions, and reference is only one of these. There is a world of difference 
between speaking about kin in the third person and speaking to them directly, face 
to face. The former situation raises questions about the referential function of 
language, the latter about the emotive and conative functions of language. These 
are moral sentiments of a socio-linguistic nature, not pure linguistic values. 
Reference terms raise the question of the abstract semantic relationship between 
ego and alter-ego; address terms, on the other hand, raise the altogether different 
question of the concrete, face-to-face relationship between the addressor and the 
addressee. The emotive or expressive function, notes Jakobson (1960: 6), is 
focused on the addresser and “aims a direct expression of the speaker’s attitude 
toward what he is speaking about. It tends to produce an impression of a certain 
emotion whether true or feigned.” The conative function, which finds its 
grammatical expression in the vocative and imperative, is oriented toward the 
addressee. Thus, it is one thing for Ego to say, “He [Alter-ego] is my father,” but 
quite another for a son to address his father as “Hi, Dad” and for the father to 
reply “Hello, Chris” in return. The relationship between Ego and Alter-ego is 
synchronic and abstract, and that between addressor and addressee is a concrete 
diachronic inter-temporal relationship whose emotive value varies according to the 
mood of the addressor and the choice of address term used, be it “daddy,” 
“father,” or “sir.” 
Verbal address is just one mode of address among many that include non-
verbal modes such as salutes. Valuation of this kind moves us from the purely 
linguistic world of the meaning of the exchange-value of reference terms to the 
meaning of reciprocal actions and reactions of people in face-to-face encounters. 
Here, kindred equality is expressed as mutual respect. In other words, a culturally 
specific notion of respect is the key value that informs equations such as (6). 
Dumont, careful ethnographer that he was, paid meticulous attention to the way 
kinship terms were used, distinguishing not only between reference and address 
but also between generic categories and individualizing terms, and potentially also 
distinguishing marriageable kindred from specific categories of married kindred.  
Trautmann (1981), by contrast, is concerned only with reference terminology and 
does not even pose the question of address. However, being the library-based 
scholar that he was, he cannot be blamed for ignoring the special problems that 
address terms pose because good ethnographic data on modes of address in India 
are virtually non-existent.   
To recapitulate my argument so far: Dumont’s thesis about affinity as a value 
embodies a number of minor theses, specifically that: 
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(a) it is culturally specific to India and cannot be understood from a dual 
organization perspective; 
(b) it must be re-phrased as “fraternity as a value”; and 
(c) value in this context means both the semantic value of reference 
terms and the moral value of address terms, the basis of the latter being 
familial love and respect.  
 
Fraternity as a value 
Fraternity as a value is of pragmatic importance to speakers of an Indian language 
because it distinguishes between marriageable and unmarriageable kin along an 
affinal chain of otherwise unrelated people. The following diagram captures the 
paradoxical fact that in Dravidian kinship systems, affines who are one marital step 
away are marriageable but those two steps away are not. A male ego places his 
BWZ in the marriageable cross-sister category XZ, but his BWBWZ is a sister, Z, 
and hence unmarriageable.   
 
 
 
The shift in perspective that Dumont is urging us to take on SI Dravidian 
marriage is difficult to grasp because it is so simple and obvious. It forces us to 
problematize a fundamental assumption that has informed discussions about 
Dravidian kinship for over one hundred years—namely, that the reference terms 
imply a prescriptive cross-cousin marriage rule. That is one way of interpreting the 
terms, but it privileges consanguinity. But because consanguinity is equal to affinity, 
the other way to interpret the reference terms is via the affinal links. From this 
perspective, there is no rule to follow but a pool of marriageable siblings to choose 
from. This forces us to see things from the perspective of potentialities rather than 
prescriptions. The language of Halbi kinship, with its distinction between 
marriageable and unmarriageable siblings, enables us to grasp the native point of 
view. It also enables us to make sense of Dumont (1983: 22) when he says that 
“affinity in a way precedes the actual marriage, that an individual has potential 
affines before he acquires actual in-laws by marriage” and that “affinity in a wider 
sense is inherited just as our ‘blood’ relationships are.”   
Fraternal alliances of this kind imply that people in India marry people they 
refer to and address as siblings. This, of course, does not imply incest, a morally 
loaded category if ever there were one. Rather, it implies what I will call sibling 
endogamy. SI kinship categories imply a brotherhood of intermarrying siblings, 
which is nothing more than a definition of caste from the local perspective of Ego. 
This ego can be male or female, but the native point of view obliges us to take the 
male perspective if we are to fully grasp Indian kin categories. This is because 
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wives are incorporated into brotherhoods in India but not into moieties, as is the 
case, for example, in Aboriginal Australia. 
We must now travel with Dumont and consider the values that inform 
fraternity as a value in North India, a region where affinity is greater than 
consanguinity, as equation (3) tries to capture.   
The word bhai (“brother”), notes Dumont (1966: 99), takes on diverse 
meanings, “from proper brother, born of the same mother and father, to an 
acceptation such as ‘man approximately equal in age to Ego’, in his village or even 
beyond it. The latter extra-kinship meaning occurs in address only.” He adds that
  
 nothing prevents its being extended indefinitely and its including all the 
members of the endogamous group or of the sub-caste (within certain 
age limits), as there is a vague notion of their being of the same blood. 
All men might even be included, insofar as they are all sons of Adam, or 
Manu. The transition is thus easy to the extra-kinship uses encountered 
in address. This way of looking at the relationship does away with some 
of our difficulties. For instance, it allows us to understand how an affine, 
say the wife’s brother sala, can be opposed to bhai in the stricter sense, 
and can also merge into the category bhai in the wider sense. For the 
most stringent interdictions of marriage prohibit it between persons who 
have a common ancestor within a certain range of generations (sapindya 
rule), or again, as long as memory of an intermarriage persists. Beyond 
that point, the opposition between consanguinity and affinity disappears, 
the affine becomes a “brother” either in the vague sense of member of 
the same endogamous group, or even in the sense of a sufficiently 
remote common ascendancy. (Dumont 1966: 100) 
Dumont’s analysis of NI kinship terms was the beginning of a long and technically 
complex debate (Dumont 1975; Jamous 1992, 2003; Vatuk 1972), but at the 
center of it is the nature of the brotherly relationship between male Ego and his 
wife’s brother. This can be expressed as a linguistic value equation of the form 
eB/yB = ZH/WB = jija/sala. This is an asymmetrical respect relationship: sala 
defers to jija regardless of age. It is like an eB/yB relationship in that the respect 
the yB gives to the eB is transferred to the jija as wife taker. This implication of this 
species of fraternal alliance is that the unmarried sister of B and the unmarried 
WB are siblings and hence unmarriageable. This is reflected in the reference 
terminology, where we find that BWB/ZHZ = B/Z = bhaiya/bhaini in Fijian Hindi. 
The following diagram summarizes the preceding argument:  
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The corollary of the unmarriageability of the BWB/ZHZ = B/Z = bhaiya/bhaini 
sibling relations is the marriageability of the WBW/HZH = saraj/nandoi 
relationship (including, most importantly, the unmarried same-sex siblings of men 
and women in this relationship, i.e., the WBWZ/HZHB relation). 
 
 
This linguistic valuation presents a stark contrast to the SI situation, where the 
same relationship is unmarriageable. The terms una (B) and akka (Z) are used to 
refer to this relationship. 
 
 
The ZHZ/BWB relation, by contrast, is marriageable. The South Indian migrants 
in Fiji, who use a mixture of Tamil and Hindi terms in their lexicon (but in an SI 
way), refer to this this relationship as mama/bhauji, as shown below. 
 
 
The term mama as used by both male and female Ego has the sense of cross-
brother (XB), but it also is used to refer to one’s mother’s brother and, as such, is a 
classic example of Dumont’s (1983: 14) argument that the affinal links are given a 
consanguineal expression. The emotive value of mama is that of extreme 
familiarity—joking kinship.  
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These stark contrasts might lead one to believe that the SI system is a mirror 
image of the NI system. This much is true of the elementary forms of fraternal 
alliance, but when these links are used to construct a chain of affinal links, the 
substantive difference can be perceived.   
The following diagram depicts the SI situation, and what is striking is the 
symmetry. Affinal chains, from the perspective of Ego, move in opposite 
directions: via the sister’s husband (to the left in the diagrams I have used) or via 
the brother’s wife (to the right). In other words, in the direction of wife takers (left) 
and wife givers (right), the Ego-centric brotherhood—the point of reference—is in 
the center. The moral sentiment informing face-to-face relations between the 
brotherhood and its wife takers, on the one hand, and between the brotherhood 
and its wife givers, on the other, is marked by mutual respect in SI and CI. All the 
relatives on this chain are referred to as siblings, but distinctions are made between 
different categories of siblings. The first is between marriageable and unmarriage-
able siblings. The latter are found in the center of the chain and at two steps 
removed, where we find, as Dumont noted, that the affines of affines are siblings, 
albeit siblings of a kind where familial moral sentiment is weaker.   
 
 
 
The crucial defining characteristic of the Indian brotherhood is that it is defined 
by husband and wife sets, on the one hand, and brother and unmarried sister sets, 
on the other. The former can be called an affinal couple, the latter a consanguineal 
couple. The symmetry to be found in SI comes about because these two sets are 
equal in that sense Dumont suggests characterizes the relationship between 
consanguinity and affinity in SI. To express this formally, the equation 
 
affinity = consanguinity 
 
finds its expression in the relationship between  
 
(H+W) = (B+Z). 
 
The values operating here get us beyond Saussure’s linguistic values and 
Jakobson’s emotive values. These are the familial sentiments of respect and love. 
The equals sign here signifies mutual respect but one where the wife is always 
obliged to defer to her husband and where the sister has to defer to her brother 
but only if he is older. The elder sister commands respect and gets it.  
Respect relations differ in NI, and the specificity of NI respect relations gives 
the linguistic values of the reference terms a sociological twist. In the north, it is not 
only the elder sister who gets respect but all sisters regardless of age, and especially 
those who are married. Her status is the reflected glory of that of her husband. He 
becomes male Ego’s new elder brother and commands respect. His sisters, too, 
become elder sisters and hence unmarriageable. This continues all along the 
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affinal chain as it heads in the sister’s husband’s direction (to the left). Male Ego, 
therefore, must look in the other direction for a wife, a younger sister of his 
younger brothers in the wife-giving direction. This gives the chain a tilt, as shown in 
the diagram below.   
 
 
 
This tilt comes about because affinity is greater than consaguinity in the north, as 
Dumont might say, because the husband/wife couple is more respected than the 
brother/sister couple. Formally: 
 
NI:   consanguinity < affinity   (3)  
 
because 
 
(B+Z) < (H+W). 
 
This tilting divides siblings into respected siblings, who are treated like elder 
siblings, and others, who are treated like younger siblings. This obliterates the 
cross/parallel distinction and severs the joint brother/sister ego, creating the elder 
sister ego and a younger brother ego who endow the reference terminology with 
new linguistic values. In short, the semantic structure of NI kinship acquires a 
husband-centric bias. The following figure captures the essence of this 
transformation in the form of the semantic tree for siblings as one moves from SI 
to NI.  
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We are now in a position to consider the question of who are the valuers. For 
Marx (1867: 4) the relationship between value and valuers was that of exchange to 
production: the values of equality and freedom in the marketplace were informed 
by the unequal relationship between capital and labor on the factory floor, a 
relationship that was masked by commodity fetishism. In the domestic domain, the 
relationship between value and valuers is not veiled in this way; it is there for all to 
see. Family relationships are tussles for power and status between men and women 
on the one hand and within a group of men and women on the other. The key 
players in the affinal chains found in India are obviously women as wives and 
sisters and men as husbands and brothers. Insofar as the NI case is concerned, the 
husband-centric bias of the linguistic values and their complementary moral values 
betray the role of the husband as the central valuer: jija (ZH), as wife taker, is a 
term of respect; sala (WB) as wife giver, is a term of abuse. In SI and CI, the 
relative strength of the brother and his values has left its mark on the form of the 
chain. The history of this struggle between husbands and brothers is impossible to 
reconstruct, but it is one that persists to this day and is fought out in the life cycle 
rituals of the people of India, especially the wedding rituals and the tussles over 
dowry, which have had many tragic consequences in North India. In Fiji, where 
relationships are more egalitarian, the Fijian kin term tavale has entered the Fiji 
Hindi lexicon as a loanword in place of sala. In Fijian, tavale refers to both WB 
and ZH and is a relationship of mutual respect and familiarity. 
The critic of the preceding argument can rightly point out that my discussion 
has been restricted to Ego’s generation to the exclusion of all others. Such a 
discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, but one of Dumont’s (1966: 111) 
examples of an actual marriage he recorded while doing fieldwork in NI gives 
some indication of where a consideration of other generations might take us. 
According to conventional wisdom, NI is characterized by the absence of cross-
cousin marriage, but Dumont found that Sarjupari Brahman males predominantly 
marry their classificatory MBD, who are referred to as bahin, or sisters. However if 
we conceive of the MB as an affine, as Dumont says, then the favored marriage 
turns out to be with a man’s actual FBWBWD. The following diagram illustrates 
what is at stake here. As we ponder the difference between the classificatory form 
of the marriage and the actual form, it becomes obvious that affinity is a good way 
of thinking about consanguinity of the classificatory type.   
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The term kaki, the father’s younger brother’s wife, can be glossed as classificatory 
“junior mother.” Thus, a man’s FyBWB is a mama, a classificatory “mother’s 
brother.” His daughter is a sister bahin but a classificatory marriageable one. Her 
mother and her mother’s sister were potentially marriageable affinal sisters for 
Ego’s father, a potentiality that is inherited by the son, as Dumont might say. 
 
Conclusion  
Trautmann’s critique of Lévi-Strauss and Dumont now defines the terms of the 
debate about Dravidian kinship. The value question is posed in terms of the 
semantics of culturally specific reference terms in cultures where a rule of cross-
cousin marriage of some kind or other prevails. Dravidian kinship is thus no 
longer a problem of Indian sociology but an abstract, transcultural theoretical one 
of typology based on different notions of crossness. Trautmann and his 
collaborators have been very successful in solving these abstract problems—so 
successful, in fact, that few questions remain to be resolved, and those that do 
probably have no solution.   
The forgoing analysis suggests that we need to go back to Lévi-Strauss and 
Dumont to now go forward. Lévi-Strauss’s assumption that fraternal alliance is of 
secondary importance needs to be questioned. Dumont’s argument that Dravidian 
kinship has culturally specific characteristics that it shares with Indo-Aryan kinship 
needs to be revisited. The fundamental contradiction in his thesis of affinity as a 
value—and I claim that this theory only makes sense as a theory of fraternity as a 
value—provides a way forward. Such an approach moves us from a focus on 
reference terms to address, from semantic value to emotive and conative values, 
and from exogamous clans to kindred groupings. Such an approach requires a 
historical geography of India of the kind that Trautmann pioneered in his 
definition of an “Indian culture of kinship” (1981: 315). Indian Dravidian kinship 
is very much a part of this culture, not apart from it as he argued, but one needs to 
focus on the pragmatics of address to appreciate this. A historical geography of 
fraternal alliances in Indian kinship takes us beyond the shores of India to the 
lands to which the diaspora has spread. In Fiji, for example, this Indian culture of 
kinship lives on in the life cycle rituals and language of the fourth- and fifth-
generation descendants of indentured laborers who went to Fiji to work on 
sugarcane plantations. However, the brotherhoods they have formed today are 
very different from the ship brotherhoods their great-grandparents formed on their 
way to Fiji. Fraternity as a value, then, poses many problems that have yet to be 
asked, let alone answered.  
Some of these problems concern unexamined Eurocentric assumptions about 
the overvaluation of consanguinity relative to affinity and contiguity, a theme that 
Viveiros de Castro (2009) develops in the context of Amazonian kinship: the 
standard Western model, he argues, has consanguinity in “the province of the 
given: it is an innate, passive property of the human relational matrix, its essential 
bodily substrate. Affinity is active construction: it is differentiating choice, affective 
or political, and inventive freedom.” The Amazon model, he asserts, is the 
converse of the Western model: “Here we find affinity as a given, internal and 
constitutive relation, and consanguinity as constructed, external and regulative” 
(2009: 259).   
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This argument echoes the argument I have been developing above about 
affinity being the cause of consanguinity in the Dravidian CI and SI systems. It is 
interesting, therefore, to see it being advanced in the context of an Amazonian 
Dravidian system and in the theoretical context of Lévi-Strauss’ (1949) discussion 
in The elementary structures of kinship about the distinction between fraternal and 
marital alliance discussed above.  
The value question, as Ton Otto remarks in the introduction to this special 
issue, traps us all. As Dumont and Viveiros de Castro remind us, we cannot 
examine the values of “them” without interrogating the values of “us”; furthermore, 
we are all agents and victims of valuation processes involving market values, 
familial values, and religious values where language is used as both means and end, 
and it has been this way since the emergence of Homo sapiens as a moral being. 
Morality, as Mauss notes (2007: 156), is “the art of living together, and it can be 
recognised by the presence of good.” Disputes about the definition of the good 
have a long history and no simple answer. The question of value must be 
continually re-posed. Familial values are only part of the story but are a domain 
where anthropology has made a significant contribution. To continue to re-pose 
these questions, we must go back to our intellectual ancestors in order to move 
forward in light of new ethnographic evidence.     
 
 
 
Acknowledgements   
This essay was first presented at the Anthropology of Value workshop in Cairns in 
December 2011. I am grateful to the participants for their comments and 
especially to the editors for thoughtful suggestions on how to clarify my argument. 
The UK ESRC has provided support for some of the research on which this paper 
is based.   
 
 
 
References 
Dumont, Louis. 1966. “Marriage in India, the present state of the question: III. 
North India in relation to South India.” Contributions to Indian Sociology (OS) 
9: 90–114. 
———. 1975. “Terminology and prestations revisited.” Contributions to Indian 
Sociology (NS) 9 (2): 197–215. 
———. 1977. From Mandeville to Marx: The genesis and triumph of economic 
ideology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
———. 1980. Homo hierarchicus: The caste system and its implications. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
———. 1983. Affinity as a value: Marriage alliance in South India, with comparative 
essays on Australia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
———. 1986a. Essays on individualism: Modern ideology in anthropological 
perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
| Chris GREGORY 
2013 | HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 3 (1): 116–39 
138 
———. 1986b. A South Indian subcaste: Social organisation and religion of the 
Pramalai Kallar. Translated and edited by Michael Moffatt and Lewis Morgan. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. 1991. German ideology: From France to Germany and back. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Galey, Jean-Claude. 2000. “Louis Dumont (1911–1998): A committed distancing.” 
American Anthropologist 102 (2): 324–28. 
Jakobson, Roman. 1960. “Closing comments: Linguistics and poetics.” In Style in 
language, edited by Thomas A. Sebeok, 350–77. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Jamous, Raymond. 1992. “The brother-married-sister relationship and marriage 
ceremonies as sacrificial rites: A case study from Northern India.” In 
Understanding rituals, edited by D. de Coppet, 52–73. London: Routledge. 
———. 2003. Kinship and rituals among the Meo of Northern India: Locating 
sibling relationship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1949) 1969. The elementary structures of kinship. London: 
Eyre & Spottiswoode. 
Malinowski, Bronisław. (1922) 1961. Argonauts of the Western Pacific. New 
York: Dutton. 
Marx, Karl. 1867. Capital. Vol. 1, A critical analysis of capitalist production. 
Moscow: Progress. 
Mauss, Marcel. 2007. Manual of ethnography. London: Berghahn Books. 
Moffatt, Michael, 1986. Introduction to A South Indian subcaste: Social 
organisation and religion of the Pramalai Kallar, by Louis Dumont. Translated 
and edited by Michael Moffatt and Lewis Morgan, 1–6. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Saussure, Ferdinand de. (1915) 1959. Course in general linguistics. London: 
Philosophical Library. 
Seligman, Brenda Z. 1935. “The incest taboo as a social regulation.” Sociological 
Review 27 (1): 75–93. 
Silverstein, Michael. 1976. “Shifters, linguistic categories, and cultural description.” 
In Meaning in anthropology, edited by Keith Basso and Henry A. Selby, 11–55. 
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 
Trautmann, Thomas R. 1981. Dravidian kinship. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Vatuk, Sylvia. 1972. “Kinship terminology in Northern India.” American 
Anthropologist 74 (3): 791–93. 
Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo. 2009. “The gift and the given: Three nano-essays on 
kinship and magic.” In Kinship and beyond: The genealogical model 
reconsidered, edited by Sandra Bamford and James Leach, 235–68. New York: 
Berghahn Books. 
THE VALUE QUESTION IN INDIA | 
2013 | HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 3 (1): 116–39 
139 
 
 
La question de la valeur en Inde : réflexions ethnographiques 
sur un débat en cours 
 
Résumé : Les termes du débat relatif aux approches anthropologiques de la valeur 
en Inde ont été fixés par Louis Dumont dont les théories avaient pour fondement 
ses études ethnographiques au Nord et au Sud de l’Inde, sa connaissance de la 
littérature sanskrite, sa synthèse de l’ethnographie comparée de l’Inde, et ses 
études sur l’histoire de la pensée économique européenne. Sa théorie de l’affinité 
comme valeur (un élément de sa théorie générale) était fondée sur une critique de 
Claude Lévi-Strauss et a été, à son tour, critiquée entre autres par Thomas 
Trautmann. À partir d’un travail de terrain effectué en Inde centrale, j’attire 
l’attention sur une hypothèse que les trois théoriciens partagent, selon laquelle 
l’alliance est assimilée à l’alliance matrimoniale et néglige l’importance de l’alliance 
fraternelle, et j’examine ses implications théoriques. 
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